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ABSTRACT 
PHAUP, ALISTAIR J. Destruction of Place: Policy Diffusion and Schenectady’s Urban  
 Redevelopment 
 Department of Economics, 2014 
 
 Cities search for solutions to local problems in other cities and on national policy 
menus. This process results in many cities relying on the same solution to the same 
problem. Usually this diffusion of policy across multiple cities produces positive results 
as environmental protection, water treatment, and other city services are expanded. 
However in urban redevelopment policy diffusion cannot be successful as redevelopment 
relies on providing unique, and sometimes competitive, projects to distressed downtowns. 
The of writings by Jane Jacobs, Gratz and Mintz, and Richard Florida result in a group of 
methods that can be used to determine the potential success or failure of various 
redevelopment projects. These methods are applied to the history of Schenectady, New 
York; the city has experienced both diffused redevelopment and non-diffused 
redevelopment and thus serves as a useful point of comparison between successful and 
unsuccessful redevelopment efforts. In Schenectady policy diffusion resulted in an 
increasingly distressed downtown, while non-diffused policy has produced positive 
results. Urban redevelopers should search for unique, and avoid diffused, solutions to 
urban redevelopment problems. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 POLICY DIFFUSION AND URBAN REDEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
 
Section One: What is Policy Diffusion? 
 Policy diffusion is generally a positive force for the public good. Through policy 
diffusion cities are able to locate systems that work well in other locales, or are 
recommended by the federal government, and implement those same systems in their 
own city. This spreading of various standards and programs has been integral to the 
standard of living that the American public now enjoys; in short policy diffusion “… is a 
good idea because it seems to work - copying another city’s pollution control statue, 
social welfare program, or other policy innovation often produces the same positive result 
for the copiers as it does for the idea’s originator.” (Gilman, 2001, 174) Indeed 
competition amongst cities to attract or retain residents guarantees the eventual diffusion 
of popular policies across many municipalities. In order to remain an attractive city to 
potential residents a city must offer similar services to competing services, which 
produces a continuously increasing standard of city services. 
 This process of adopting other city’s popular programs locally only improves a 
city if it is non-competitive. Since most of the projects inspired by policy diffusion are 
strict public goods this distinction rarely matters, but in the case of urban redevelopment 
cities enter into less strictly defined areas. All cities can enjoy pollution control, but 
building an additional aquarium does not increase the number of residents who wish to go 
to one. Since urban redevelopment usually attempts to revitalize a city through both 
	   	   	  	  
5	  
public and private means, the application of diffused policy in this case will produce poor 
results as cities replicate existing projects and see only diminishing returns. Urban 
redevelopers are capable of supplying public goods, like street improvement and 
beautification. However larger redevelopment projects will begin to incorporate private 
elements, and this produces negatives results as “… cites can replicate most successful 
policy ideas almost indefinitely because they are not competitive in nature, solutions to 
urban decline tend to exist in competition with policies in other cities. Overreplication of 
a good idea produces diminishing returns for all those implementing the program even 
for the innovator of the idea.” (Gilman, 2001, 5) 
 The same competitive redevelopment project cannot be successful in all cities; 
every municipality cannot have an aquarium, theme park, or conference center and expect 
to see the same levels of interest at all locations. The law of diminishing return applies to 
many redevelopment projects. Unfortunately in many cities urban decay is countered by 
the same techniques that the city uses to approach other problems,  “Cities everywhere 
deal with urban decline much as they deal with other problems they face: they identify 
the problem and then search for a solution. Often that solution is copied from another 
community that has death with the same problem or from national policy menus.” 
(Gilman, 2001, 5) Since city governments are comfortable copying techniques from other 
cities diffused urban redevelopment is assured.  
Cities in the U.S. are particularly susceptible to policy diffusion as federal policy 
encourages cities to select urban redevelopment projects from a national menu; “Given 
the U.S. tradition of home rule on land-use issues, the national government is inhibited 
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from issuing restrictions. Instead it subsidizes entrepreneurs or local governments to 
pursue a given development pattern.” (Logan and Molotch, 1987, 166)  
 Federal funding often provides the vital portion of the funding required for urban 
redevelopment projects to proceed. The federal government must attempt to select 
projects that are viable and likely to succeed; unfortunately the bureaucratic and non-
competitive aspects of these funding sources lead cities towards policy diffusion. Federal 
urban redevelopment programs have to decide which projects to fund and which to reject’ 
the criteria of spending capital in a reasonable manner, and the basis of need within the 
city inform federal decision-making. Thus it is far easier to present a plan similar to those 
submitted by other cities that have been approved for funding than it is to receive funding 
for a wholly original project. Federal involvement in urban redevelopment encourages 
cities to proceed with large projects that are similar to those already in existence in 
nearby and competing municipalities. (Gilman, 2001, 15) 
 Policy diffusion is further engrained in urban redevelopment by the role played by 
consultants. Urban redevelopment consultants are hired by cities to provide valuable 
knowledge gleaned from their experiences in other cities working on a multitude of 
different projects; in reality consultants gain reputation for their ability to successfully 
complete similar types of projects. Consultants are heavily incentivized to convince their 
employers to proceed with projects similar to the ones they have successfully completed 
in other cities; the consultant stands to gain the most from the repetition of a previously 
completed project as this will allow the consultant to specialize in completing a specific 
type of project. The consultant’s method of career development tends to produce diffused 
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urban redevelopment as consultants, “further strengthen - and are in turn supported by - 
the system bias toward existing policy solutions.” (Gilman, 2001, 16) 
Cities are forced into policy diffusion from multiple sides. Internally cities are 
comfortable locating successful programs in other cities and implementing similar 
projects with no ill effects. Federal funding tends to flow towards diffused projects as 
these projects are seen as safe bets with a higher chance of success. Finally, city hired 
consultants suggest projects similar to the ones that they have already successfully 
completed elsewhere. Without significant resistance it is impossible for cities to avoid the 
attraction of policy diffusion. 
It is vital that cities determined to fight urban decline through redevelopment 
avoid policy diffusion. Diffusion is an intuitive solution to many of the problems of 
cities, but cannot be successful in redevelopment. Unfortunately cities are surrounded by 
incentives to pursue diffused policy making it “difficult for cities to diverge from national 
goals; it is easier for localities to jump on the national bandwagon of policy offerings 
rather than to search for a uniquely tailored solution to their particular socioeconomic 
problem.” (Gilman, 2001, 10) It is these uniquely tailored solutions that have the 
potential to encourage real economic development within traditionally declining urban 
areas. 
Policy diffusion is an entropic force in urban redevelopment. It requires effort to 
overcome, and any redevelopment that does not retain the requisite emphasis on avoiding 
diffusion cannot succeed. Fortunately the redevelopment theories of Jane Jacobs and 
Richard Florida provide valuable metrics for urban redevelopers attempting to find 
innovative solutions to the particular problems of a specific city. The experiences of 
	   	   	  	  
8	  
Schenectady, New York, also provide valuable insight into how a city can both fall 
victim to policy diffusion, and overcome it. By understanding the implications of these 
theories and history a clear strategy of project selection and eventual success in urban 
redevelopment can be developed. The goal of redevelopment, when avoiding policy 
diffusion, is to create a system that can provide specific and innovative solutions to the 
particular problems of an individual city. 
Section Two: Jane Jacobs and Busy Streets 
 Redevelopment groups must be able to make decisions concerning which projects 
to pursue, and which to avoid in order to avoid policy diffusion. In order to do this 
redevelopers must understand why cities are important, how successful cities operate, and 
which types of projects can move a city towards vibrancy. Jane Jacobs provides an 
explanation of the importance of cities, and the ways in which successful cities operate, 
Gratz and Mintz provide a method of distinguishing between diffused and non-diffused 
projects, while Richard Florida describes the types of cities that attract and retain 
residents. The writings of all four of these authors can be used to distinguish between 
well planned, and poorly advised, urban redevelopment projects. 
Throughout the mid 20th century the Great Depression, Second World War, and 
development of suburbs drew residents away from city centers or significantly damaged 
these urban downtowns; reversing the resulting decay of urban centers has been the 
central policy of many of these city’s governments. Currently around 80% of the nation’s 
population lives in urban areas, so the development of cities that function well is of 
importance to a large number of people. (United Nations, 2012) Not all cities are in need 
of redevelopment, but the benefits to run-down cities that are able to successfully 
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redevelop should be clear: these cities will be able to regain population and succeed 
economically, while those cities that are unsuccessful in their efforts will fail. Jane 
Jacobs, a noted urban redevelopment critic, describes the importance of active cities in 
terms of national importance, “Societies and civilizations in which the cities stagnate and 
don’t develop and flourish further. They deteriorate.” (Jacobs, 1984, 232.) The 
redevelopment of American cities is of vast importance. 
 Urban redevelopment projects are usually a collaborative effort between an urban 
redevelopment corporation and some combination of federal programs, local non-profits, 
and for-profit investors. The types of projects can be broadly categorized into two types 
of projects. First there are projects that are designed to produce a profit for an investor. In 
these projects an investor will approach the redevelopment group in order to obtain 
grants, loans, or tax incentives; these projects usually involve establishing, or relocating, 
businesses to a city. Second there are projects that are not designed to produce a profit, 
but will improve some other aspect of the city, usually through the introduction of 
additional city services, beyond the introduction of additional businesses. For-profit 
investment in these types of project is rare, as the investor cannot realize any profits on 
this sort of work; city government, federal grants, and the redevelopment group usually 
fund public projects. Since urban redevelopers are asked to provide funding to both types 
of projects, it is important that redevelopers be able to make funding decisions regarding 
both types of projects. Fortunately the system proposed by Jane Jacobs applies to both 
types of project. 
The workings of older city streets provide much inspiration to Jacobs. Her 
writings provide a valuable decision-making tool for redevelopers, “Under the seeming 
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disorder of the old city, wherever the old city is working successfully, is a marvelous 
order for maintaining the safety of the streets and the freedom of the city. It is a complex 
order. Its essence is intricacy of sidewalk use, bringing with it a constant succession of 
eyes.” (Jacobs, 1961, 50) A healthy city street engages those around and in it; the action 
in the street makes the area feel safe since those watching the street will immediately 
notice any activity. This sense of safety further encourages interaction in the street, which 
in turn increases the sense of safety. Creating active streets is an important redevelopment 
goal, as these streets will encourage additional interaction, and business, within the city. 
Of course such a self-policing system only operates while the street is in use. City 
streets should therefore be redeveloped with the intent of encouraging foot traffic at all 
times of day, “…the sidewalk must have users on it fairly continuously, both to add to the 
number of effective eyes on the street and to induce the people in the buildings along the 
street to watch the sidewalks in sufficient numbers. Nobody enjoys sitting on a stoop or 
looking out a window at an empty street.” (Jacobs, 1961, 34) Redevelopers can 
encourage the continuous use of a street by funding businesses that operate at different 
times of day; if this is not possible then it is important to have the street connect 
businesses that operate at different times of day. A street that is constantly in use will 
provide a constant sense of safety to its residents.  
Fortunately activity creates more activity. When a street is in use it will naturally 
draw non-residents. Jacobs notices this tendency within her own neighborhood, 
“Strangers become an enormous asset on the street on which I live, and the spurs off it, 
particularly at night when safety assets are most needed. We are fortunate enough, on the 
street, to be gifted not only with a locally supported bar and another round the corner, but 
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also with a famous bar that draws continuous troops of strangers from adjoining 
neighborhoods and even from out of town.” (Jacobs, 1961, 34) The varied levels of 
businesses, accompanied by residential apartments, work together to create activity. By 
developing both residential and varied commercial opportunities, an area is more likely to 
be active. At the same time an active street draws more people to it, includes the 
residents, and feels safer than an inactive and empty street. When many of the streets in a 
city are active, and thus considered safe, the entire city will feel safe. 
 To create streets that feel safe, urban redevelopers should consider projects that 
draw people into the street during all times of day. Conversely this implies that 
redevelopers should avoid projects that make a street less commercially diverse, or that 
will only be used during specific times. Projects that take up entire city blocks, or that are 
used during times that the city is already in use should be discouraged; engaging residents 
and visitors in the urban environment is of critical importance. In prior years many 
redevelopment projects attempted to combat the rise of the suburb by producing a 
suburban style environment in downtowns. The projects that the suburbanization of 
downtown inspired could not regularly reproduce suburban results in an urban area. 
(Gratz and Mintz, 1998, 3) These projects that distracted from the city failed to produce 
active streets since suburban design discouraged exactly the type of activity that made 
streets enjoyable to watch in the first place. Much of suburban planning is based on 
creating similar environments, and this type of development may be successful in those 
areas, but it is impossible to hide an entire city. Redevelopment projects must engage 
people with the urban environment. 
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Projects that engage the public with the city can be varied, and do not fit any 
particular formula. To provide one example of the variation that is possible; in Mansfield 
Ohio the city constructed a carousel in an underutilized, unsafe, part of town. (Gratz and 
Mintz, 1998, 15) While the project was initially met with ridicule, it was eventually 
successful in providing a focal point for new businesses to operate around. By creating an 
attraction for local residents the city was able to inspire new business activity, and begin 
the redevelopment process. Of course every city seeking to redevelop should not 
immediately begin construction on a new Ferris wheel, or roller coaster, as such action 
would be policy diffusion, but redevelopers should not immediately dismiss projects 
because they have not been tried before. Innovation, when tempered by a realistic 
understanding of the economic condition of the city, is the key to successful 
redevelopment. (Gratz and Mintz, 1998, 19) A project that has not been completed 
elsewhere may be a much better opportunity for a city, although there is certainly some 
risk in attempting any new project, but continuing with policy diffusion will not produce 
excellent results either. Regardless of project type the production of active streets is 
vitally important. 
Section Three: Types of Urban Redevelopers 
 A team of urban redevelopers, Gratz and Mintz, tackle the question of success in 
urban redevelopment using a different approach from Jacobs, but produce similar results. 
Gratz and Mintz divide project proponents into two groups of redevelopers: project 
planners and urban husbanders. These two types of redevelopers are distinguished by 
their views of the urban redevelopment and their suggested solutions. Project planners 
typically feel that,  “a project must be big to be meaningful. … Under this Project-based 
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Planning, the new is added at a large enough scale to overwhelm and alter what exists.” 
(Gratz and Mintz, 1998, 59) These types of redevelopers see very little of use in the 
existing structure of the city and attempt to construct an urban environment that bears 
little to no resemblance to the existing city. 
The other view of urban redevelopment is found with the urban husbanders. 
These redevelopers “assume that assets are already in place to be reinvigorated and built 
onto in order to stimulate a place-based rejuvenation that adds to the long-evolving, 
existing strengths, instead of replacing them.” (Gratz and Mintz, 1998, 61) There are no 
projects typical of an urban husbander as they tend to propose projects that are either 
unique to an area or, like street beautification, are considered a common sense approach 
to redevelopment. These projects are capable of producing active and varied city streets. 
Gratz and Mintz favor the view of the urban husbander over that of the project planner. 
(Gratz and Mintz, 1998, 82)  
Gratz and Mintz’ view that redevelopment should use the existing density of older 
city streets as an advantage corroborates Jacobs’ theory of the importance of active 
streets. Urban husbanders are less likely to favor large projects that require demolition 
instead favoring projects of any size that rejuvenate the older portions of the city. In spite 
of the different approach utilized by both authors Jacobs, and Gratz and Mintz arrive at 
similar conclusions regarding the role of active streets and utilization of existing assets 
around the city. 
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Section Four: Import Replacement in Urban Redevelopment 
Cities must thrive both socially and economically. In order to attain this desired 
result urban redevelopment cannot focus solely on providing a pleasant and varied urban 
environment, but must also consider the interactions between cities and their role both 
nationally and internationally. Moreover from a practical standpoint an understanding of 
the types of businesses that allow cities to expand is useful when considering funding 
decisions made by urban redevelopment groups; here Jane Jacobs’ concept of growth 
through import replacement is invaluable. 
Cities are only capable of producing specific goods. Thus some goods will be 
produced domestically and other will have to be imported from other parts of the world. 
Based on a city-region view, with cities forming regions of economic influence, these 
city regions will develop systems for imports and exports that are similar to those of 
nations. Like many nations cities generally prefer to produce goods domestically as 
domestic production is seen as keeping capital within the city-region. Import replacement 
is the process by which a city begins to produce a previously imported good 
domestically. From a national perspective this is similar to a nation developing a 
domestic car manufacturer to avoid importing foreign models.  
Import-replacement tends to start with basic goods. When a city is first founded it 
will need to produce food, building materials, and other necessities. Over time the city 
can begin to replace historically imported capital intense goods until with domestically 
produced versions. (Jacobs, 1984, 38) Eventually only luxury items need to be imported. 
Through this process the city continuously grows economically. This process takes place 
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in most cities in the United States; however not all city-regions are capable of growth 
through import replacement. 
It may appear that import replacement will lead to a city reducing its imports over 
time, however import replacement does not tend to reduce imports. Instead import 
replacement reduces the importation of low-capital goods and shifts a city towards 
importing higher capital goods over time. Import replacement forces cities to expand 
their interaction with other city-regions in order to obtain these goods. (Jacobs, 1984, 39) 
Fortunately this process is self-replicating as these new imports can eventually be import-
replaced, which in turn allows for further economic expansion. Import-replacement is the 
key to becoming a city at all, “Any settlement that becomes good at import-replacing 
becomes a city. And any city that repeatedly experiences, from time to time, explosive 
episodes of import-replacing keeps its economy up-to-date and helps keep itself capable 
of casting forth streams of innovative export work.” (Jacobs, 1984, 41)  
Given the importance of import replacement the goal urban redevelopers should 
work to encourage the process. In addition businesses that replace an imported good with 
a domestically produced good stand a good chance of success; a business that import-
replaces is sure to have a local customer base, and knows that it will produce a good that 
is in demand. Both of these qualities contribute to, but certainly do not guarantee, the 
success of the business. Beyond the success of the business itself, companies that import-
replace are capable of expanding the economic influence of the city. Companies that 
import-replace offer additional benefits beyond those offered by the simple existence of 
an additional company. 
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Businesses that create an entirely new product do not import replace. Moreover 
there is an increased chance that these businesses will not be successful. The goal of 
urban redevelopment is to expand the economic activity of the city; redevelopers should 
prefer import-replacing proposals. As Jacobs describes it, “Economic life develops by 
grace of innovating; it expands by grace of import-replacing,” (Jacobs, 1984, 39) since 
redevelopers are interested in the economic expansion of the city-region they should 
prefer import-replacement to innovation in their funding decisions. 
Earlier it was noted that not all regions are capable of growth through import-
replacement. While these supply regions are not as prevalent in the United States, with 
the arguable exception of the Midwest during certain time periods, they do exist. Supply 
regions produce a vast amount of goods for export. Through the proceeds of these exports 
the region is then able to supply itself with what it cannot produce domestically. Thus 
there is no need for import replacement. Unfortunately this arrangement is incapable of 
producing vibrant cities; cities in supply regions do not develop their own regional 
influence and tend to stagnate over time. (Jacobs, 1984, 59) 
 In some cases a supply region will develop around a technological deficiency or a 
geographic advantage. In 1822 ice trade began when William Leftwhich began shipping 
ice to London from Norway. While the initial shipment of ice managed to freeze en route 
to England, the ice was further insulated on later voyages, and a highly profitable 
industry was born. Because of Norway’s geographic advantage in ice production the 
region became quite wealthy and controlled a large portion of the market in the ice trade; 
by 1900 Norway was exporting 99% of the total ice traded globally with an annual one 
million tons of ice leaving the country. Through the early 20th century the refrigerator was 
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gaining popularity and affordability and quickly replaced Norwegian ice as the primary 
method of keeping food cold. By 1920 Norway was exporting just 5% of what it had 
exported in 1910. (Blain, Bodil, B, 2006, 2) Since Norway could no longer profitably 
operate as a supply region its cities were able to begin import replacement. Today Oslo is 
the fastest growing city in Europe. (Nina Berglund, 2012) The disappearance of a 
formerly active trade is not easy for a supply region, but it by no means dooms the region 
to being an economic backwater forever. 
Section Five: Courting the Creative Class 
 The Creative Class, as described by Richard Florida, details the rapid growth of a 
previously small segment of workers. There has always been a place for the creative in 
society, but since the 1950s their value to businesses has grown exponentially fueling 
increasing numbers of people to enter into creative professions. A city that is capable of 
attracting these creative people is also capable of attracting their employers, but must 
contend with their desire for vibrant city life. From this theoretical base previously 
developed a broader system for successful urban redevelopment can be created; Jane 
Jacobs’ theories are helpful when considering specific aspects of proposals, but do not 
contain very much advise for cities attempting to maneuver in this new creative economy. 
 The designation Creative Class comprises two different types of worker. First 
there are those in the Super-Creative Core; this group consists of the traditionally creative 
enterprise; artists, poets, scientists, engineers, and professors are fall into this group. The 
super-creative core has existed for quite some time, and while this group has been 
growing slowly for many decades it is the growth in the second group that is fueling the 
tremendous growth of the Creative Class. (Richard Florida, 2002, 75) This second group, 
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the Creative Professionals, consist of those working in knowledge intensive sectors; law 
firms, hospitals, and high tech firms. (Richard Florida, 2002, 68-69) It is growth in the 
Creative Professional subdivision that has contributed the rapid growth of the Creative 
Class. 
 Those in the Creative Class tend to have similar values; they usually appreciate 
individuality, meritocracy, diversity, and openness. Individuality, meritocracy, and 
openness are not within the influence of urban redevelopers, diversity can certainly be 
encouraged; the ability of a city to attract varieties of people indicates the degree to 
which the city holds the same values as the creative class. (Richard Florida, 2002, 79) 
 The Creative Class appreciates diversity, but it is not a particularly diverse group 
itself. While the class, “has opened up new avenues of advancement for women and 
members of ethnic minorities, its existence has certainly failed to put an end to long-
standing divisions of race and gender. Within high-tech industries in particular these 
divisions still seem to hold.” (Richard Florida, 2002, 79-80) Since a city must be diverse 
in order to attract the Creative Class, and the class itself is not capable of supplying the 
diversity it desires, it is necessary for redevelopers attempting to develop a creative 
economy to consider projects designed to make their city more diverse in addition to 
projects designed specifically to attract the Creative Class. 
 The Creative Class strives to experience broadly, “They like indigenous street-
level culture - a teeming blend of cafes, sidewalk musicians, and small galleries and 
bistros, where it is hard to draw the lie between participant and observer, or between 
creativity and its creators. They crave creative stimulation but not escape.” (Richard 
Florida, 2002, 166) A street that provides this type of experience will meet the 
	   	   	  	  
19	  
expectations of a safe street as described by Jacobs, and moreover fits her description of 
an old city street quite well. Florida and Jacobs produce the same conclusions regarding 
the appearance and function of a street. 
 Those in the Creative Class tend to not follow traditional career paths. Instead of 
working for one company for a long period of time before possibly changing to another 
company, “They do not expect to stay with the same company for very long. Companies 
are disloyal and careers are increasingly horizontal. To be attractive, places need to offer 
a job market that is conducive to a horizontal career path. In other words, places have to 
offer a thick labor market.” (Richard Florida, 2002, 223) This changes the method that 
redevelopers should use when considering attracting companies to their area. Instead of 
focusing on attracting a single large employer to an area, urban redevelopers need to 
provide multiple small firms operating in creative industries. This insures that the current 
employees of these companies will be able to stay in the area when they decide to move 
on since a similar job with another company will be available within the area. Large 
employers are still a benefit to an area, but if there are no other creative class employers, 
then the revolving door of creative talent will not be able to sustain itself within the city. 
(Richard Florida, 2002, 283) 
 Employers are increasingly willing to relocate in order to employ the creative 
class, “The bottom line is that cities need a people climate even more than they need a 
business climate. This means supporting creativity across the board - in all of its various 
facets and dimensions - and building a community that is attractive to creative people, not 
just to high-tech companies.” (Richard Florida, 2002, 283) It is no longer sufficient for a 
region to adopt low tax rates and business friendly codes and wait for the local economy 
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to develop. Cultivating the Creative Class is a tricky process that requires redevelopers to 
consider their region from every aspect and particularly in terms of the experiences that it 
offers, “Instead of subsidizing companies, stadiums and retail centers, communities need 
to be open to diversity and invest in the kinds of lifestyle options and amenities that 
people really want.” (Richard Florida, 2002, 283) Redevelopment organizations need to 
consider projects that have the capacity to modify many aspects of the city-region in 
order to attract the creative class; once again projects that do not fit into the traditional 
garb of redevelopment can be important gateways to growth. 
 Attracting the Creative Class is very good for the cities that are able to do it. As of 
2002 the creative class represented approximately 30% of the American workforce 
comprising approximately 38.3 million people; if anything this percentage has grown 
over the past decade. (Richard Florida, 2002, 74) Attracting the creative class does not 
just relocate creative jobs to a redeveloping city; creative workers require many more 
traditionally employed people to work in the service industries upon which the Creative 
Class depends. By attracting the Creative Class urban redevelopers can benefit from 
increased activity in more traditional sectors of the economy. Since employment will tend 
to follow the highly sought members of the Creative Class redevelopers can focus on 
developing a city capable of sustaining a Creative Class while simultaneously enjoying 
increased activity in all parts of the city’s economy. (Richard Florida, 2002, 215-216) 
 Cities have many advantages over rural areas in attracting the Creative Class. 
Diversity is easier to encourage in an urban setting, and the tight-knit types of businesses 
that creative people enjoy are easier to come by in a city. (Richard Florida, 2002, 287) In 
order to capitalize on the possibilities created by the expansion of the Creative Class, 
	   	   	  	  
21	  
urban redevelopers must depart completely from older models of redevelopment. 
Traditionally redevelopers, “pay lip service to the need to attract talent, but continue to 
pour resources into underwriting big-box retailers, subsidizing downtown malls, 
recruiting call centers, and squandering precious taxpayer dollars on extravagant stadium 
complexes.” (Richard Florida, 2002, 302-303) This strategy must be reversed in order for 
a city to successfully attract the Creative Class. 
 Suggesting that every redeveloping city attract the Creative Class may appear to 
be policy diffusion. Cities can all attempt to attract the Creative Class without fear of 
diffusing the policy. First the group is very large; approximately 30% of the workforce is 
part of the class, so there is certainly considerable demand for cities that will inspire 
creativity. Second the Creative Class do not all want to live in the same city; the same 
elements that inspire some will discourage others, so there is no reason to expect that a 
city will not be able to attract creative people with the correct infrastructure. Silicon 
Valley has been particularly successful in encouraging the Creative Class to settle within 
its limits, but not every city can, or needs to be, the next Silicon Valley. (Richard Florida, 
2002, 283) There is a need for many different types of creative cities and any city can 
become a creative place. Attracting the Creative Class is not a diffused policy; instead it 
is one strategy for successful redevelopment. 
 Developing the infrastructure that attracts the Creative Class also attracts many 
other types of people and improves the city beyond the simple population growth. The 
Creative Class is attracted to vibrant and energetic cities; many people not employed in 
creative careers are drawn towards these cities as well. By developing a city with the 
demands of the Creative Class in mind redevelopers can consider their strategies from a 
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specific perspective that is capable of moving in the city in a direction that many people 
will appreciate. In addition to the cultural bonus associated with the Creative Class there 
is also a significant economic advantage; attracting the Creative Class reduces the need to 
convince companies to move to a particular location. Businesses seek out creative people 
and will be more willing to move to areas that can retain creativity. Attracting the 
Creative Class frees urban redevelopers to consider untested projects with the capacity to 
transform an urban economy. 
 All three of the redevelopment theories presented suggest that uniquely tailored 
projects will produce effective redevelopment. Unique projects avoid diffusion since they 
cannot be copied from other cities, and therefore cannot experience the diminishing 
returns associated with diffused projects. Certainly federal funding can be more difficult 
to obtain for unique projects, but changes to federal policy has reduced redevelopment 
funding so this is worth less consideration. Further unique projects allow cities to develop 
the distinctive urban identity that the creative class desires
	  	   23	  
DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL 
 The model employed is reasonably basic. Policy diffusion in urban redevelopment 
necessarily produces negative results for cities; by resisting diffused policy, a city stands 
a better chance of redeveloping successfully. In order to establish this model a review of 
various, and largely independent, theories was conducted in the previous chapter. The 
result of these theories has shown that this model can be logically obtained through the 
study of any one of the theories presented. Jacobs’ model of street activity, the work of 
Gratz and Mintz, and Florida’s Creative Class all lead to the conclusion that policy 
diffusion has a significant and negative impact on urban redevelopment efforts. 
 Given this theoretical background an examination of specific redevelopment 
projects can be conducted. Schenectady’s history is particularly applicable in this case 
since it contains two distinct periods. The first period, lasting from 1948 until the mid 
1990s, used diffused policies in an attempt to redevelop the failing downtown area. This 
era was largely unsuccessful. The second period, beginning in the late 1990s and 
continuing to the present, has resisted the draw of policy diffusion through a new urban 
redevelopment agency. This agency has been successful in redeveloping certain areas of 
the city. Thus the historical record supports the suggestion that policy diffusion produces 
negative results. 
In many portions of this historical discussion, and indeed in much of the prior 
section, imprecise terms were utilized. The use of broad terms like positive and negative 
is required when evaluating urban redevelopment theory and projects. Since the overall 
health of a city is dependent on many variables, it is impossible to produce a complete list 
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of all dependent variables that can be used to determine whether or not a project was 
successful. Thus a certain level of imprecision is introduced in any discussion of success 
or failure as qualitative data must be applied. Fortunately for this analysis Schenectady’s 
redevelopment projects are either clearly successful or clearly unsuccessful; much of this 
imprecision is negligible. To take one example, as will be detailed in the next chapter it 
would be impossible to argue that Canal Square was a successful project. Through this 
linguistic imprecision it is possible to support the suggestion that policy diffusion 
necessarily produces negative results in redevelopment.
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CHAPTER TWO 
 POLICY DIFFUSION AND SCHENECTADY’S REDEVELOPMENT 
 
Section One: Schenectady’s Early Planning 
 The contrasting results of diffused and undiffused redevelopment are evident in 
the recent history of Schenectady New York. Starting in the late 1940s, Schenectady 
embarked on a redevelopment program based on the theory of urban renewal, which 
dictated the clearing of expansive blighted areas of the city. This approach failed to 
produce appreciable results, and so the city began a redevelopment effort that relied 
heavily on the success of large-scale projects through the 70s and 80s. Both of these 
approaches to redevelopment were the result of diffused policy. In recent years the 
founding of the Metroplex Redevelopment Authority has allowed the city to begin 
redevelopment without policy diffusion; the results of this new redevelopment have been 
positive. 
 Schenectady benefited greatly from the industrial growth of the late 19th, and early 
20th, century. The proximity of a General Electric factory to the downtown combined 
with the American Locomotive factory created the, “City that Lights and Hauls the 
World.” (City of Schenectady, “Schenectady :: History”) Due to the influx of new 
residents during the early 1900s the city began to develop plans for developing an urban 
area that could accommodate all of the new workers. In 1912, led by Charles P. 
Steinmetz, the city hired a Cambridge, Massachusetts firm to prepare a report on the 
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prospects for growth in the region. The report was never publicly published, but it did set 
the stage for future city planning. (Spencer, 2001, 52) 
A second report was prepared in 1924 by Harland Bartholomew and Associates; 
the new city plan indicated that Schenectady, then with a population of 90,000, would 
grow by 25% every ten years to a population of half a million by the year 2,000. These 
estimates were based on a straight-line approximation of the growth trends apparent in 
1924. Consequently the estimates had no base in reality and history has proven them to 
be resoundingly false; the actual population of Schenectady in 2,000 was only a little 
above 60,000. (City of Schenectady, “Schenectady :: History”) Nevertheless the plan that 
was published in 1924 supported the widening of streets and expansion of the local 
streetcar system to accommodate the swaths of citizens that would soon be moving to the 
area. Very little of the 1924 plan was ever implemented. (Spencer, 2001, 52) 
Section Two: A History of Federal Redevelopment Programs 
This process of demolishing began during the 1930s and accelerated through the 
1940s. Cities increasingly cleared slums and other blighted areas and sold the land to 
private developers in the hopes of combating the growing popularity of suburban life. 
(Gotham and Hutchinson, 2001, 7) These federally established programs were unable to 
combat the decay experienced by cities, and so during the Great Depression and 
throughout the 1940s many urban leaders called for expanded federal programs to help 
cities revitalize their failing downtowns. (Gotham and Hutchinson, 2001, 6) The Housing 
Act of 1949 allowed cities to create urban redevelopment authorities designed to 
designate and clear blighted areas of the cities. Earlier Housing Acts had focused entirely 
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on housing and not on redevelopment. The 1949 act also expanded urban renewal 
programs, enabling many cities to follow New Orleans and Detroit.  
 The urban redevelopment programs of the mid 20th century found their root in 
much earlier reform efforts. Housing reformers of the late 19th and early 20th century 
heavily influenced early urban redevelopment efforts through their insistence on the 
detrimental effects of slums and the need to establish public housing options. These 
reformers concluded that the dismal housing conditions experienced by the urban poor 
must have a proportional impact on the resident’s morality and health. In order to rectify 
this situation, reformers attempted to establish building codes, housing projects, and 
sanitation regulations. In Europe many countries were able to begin development of 
housing projects, but efforts in the United States were severely delayed due to the arrival 
of the Great Depression. (Hoffman, 2000, 300) 
 These reformers succeeded in producing new regulations in many cities, but these 
regulations were not effective in preventing the spread of the slums. The Great 
Depression moved responsibility for redevelopment to the federal level. The Depression 
limited the financial ability of cities to act against slums and prevented the development 
of additional regulations, but the new deal created a political climate in which the federal 
government could develop a national housing program to combat the growth of slums. In 
a time when many Americans struggled to keep their houses, the concept of an enormous 
federally funded rental housing program was deemed sensible. Thus the National 
Housing Act of 1934 established the Federal Housing Administration, which provided 
insurance on housing and a secondary market for mortgages. This marked the entrance of 
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the federal government into the housing system, but later developments would produce 
much greater effects. (Hoffman, 2000, 301) 
 Cities also benefited from the funding available through the New Deal. In Kansas 
City a few skyscrapers, a courthouse, city hall, a baseball stadium, and a convention 
center were all built using funds and labor provided by these federal programs. While 
later redevelopment relied on the passage of Housing Acts to expand the power of 
redevelopment groups, the New Deal financed a few large-scale projects as well. The 
practice of clearing of large areas of land to remove blight from cities also began during 
the depression. The Housing Act of 1937 allowed cities to establish housing authorities 
with the power of eminent domain; Detroit and New Orleans, with the help of the Works 
Progress Administration both established housing authorities that allowed the city to 
seize and raise blighted areas. (Gotham and Hutchinson, 2001, 6) 
 As the Great Depression continued, many urban leaders noted that many wealthy 
residents were moving out of the city and into the suburbs. Concerned that this movement 
of wealthy citizens from the city combined with the continuing growth of the slums 
would eventually destroy the city, these leaders began to consider urban redevelopment 
programs that would clear the slums, and provide better infrastructure for wealthier 
residents to return to.  In 1941 these leaders, through the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards, popularized the suggestion that cities actively pursue redevelopment 
through metropolitan land commissions with the power to seize slums through eminent 
domain. Since many landowners were unwilling to sell their deteriorating apartments due 
to their sustained profitability, additional legal powers were considered necessary to 
produce the desired demolition. Between 1941 and 1948, 25 states created redevelopment 
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programs based on the association’s plan. Demolishing blighted areas became the default 
system of urban redevelopment with very little discussion of other potential methods. 
(Hoffman, 2000, 304) 
 The housing issue was largely tabled during the Second World War as the 
nation’s attention was focused on other issues, but the return of soldiers prompted a 
renewed discussion on housing. After expanding a few provisions of the Federal Housing 
Administration, congress began considering a new housing act for 1949. On its eventual 
passage the bill contained a two important provisions. First the bill provided one billion 
dollars for cities to purchase and clear slums. Second the bill restarted federal housing 
programs by providing federal loans for low-rent housing. These houses were to be built 
at low cost and provide housing for 20% below the general market price for low-rent 
housing. (Hoffman, 2000, 310) 
Many cities expressed interest in undergoing urban redevelopment, but few began 
demolition, “More than 200 local governments wanted to use urban redevelopment funds, 
but only 60 had begun to acquire land and a mere half-dozen had started to rebuild.” 
(Hoffman, 2000, 313) Meanwhile the Housing Act of 1954 replaced urban 
redevelopment with urban renewal. The new terminology expressed changes to the law, 
which allowed cities to redevelop blighted and potentially blighted areas in addition to 
the slums already included in the 1949 law. The changes to the housing act were designed 
to move away from the demolition heavy approach favored in the 1949 law, and support 
rehabilitation of existing infrastructure as well as the enforcement of building codes. 
(Hoffman, 2000, 313-14)  
	   	   	  	  
30	  
Much of the criticism of urban renewal stems from the long development time 
and questionable nature of the projects in general. City residents grew increasingly 
frustrated by vacant lots and few signs of progress, “According to the National 
Commission on Urban Problems, almost a third of urban renewal projects took 6 to 9 
years to complete; more than a third took from 9 to 15 years.” At the same time some of 
the funded projects took place in areas that were not blighted or slums. In New York City 
the Columbus Circle area, consisting of around 2% slum real estate, was cleared to make 
way for the New York Coliseum. (Hoffman, 2000, 317) 
 By the 1970s the interest in urban renewal had dwindled, but the problems created 
by the large demolitions had vastly inhibited the ability of cities to redevelop effectively. 
The urban renewal approach had not helped to revitalize distressed downtowns but had, 
in fact, increased the rate of decay of urban centers across the United States. 
Redevelopers had been reluctant to rebuild on the sites provided by the mass clearances 
and many shovel-ready locations became vacant lots for decades rather than an 
improvement on the original structure. It had also been assumed that residents of blighted 
areas would support the mass seizing of their homes in the name of progress; predictably 
this assumption was discovered to be false as city residents opposed the creation of 
shovel-ready sites due to their destabilizing and segregating effects. Residents also found 
fault in the allocation of federal resources for large institutions like hospitals and 
universities while failing to provide, as the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 stated, “a 
decent home for every American.” (Gotham and Hutchinson, 2001, 11) 
In 1973 President Nixon declared a moratorium on all federal housing projects; 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 followed quickly. This act 
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encouraged the preservation of existing structures for historic and aesthetic reasons as 
well as providing funds for a larger variety of redevelopment projects. In many cities the 
funds were distributed across the city to multiple projects instead of concentrating on a 
single large project. During this period urban redevelopment funding became 
discretionary for city governments with federal funds available with fewer stipulations. 
(Hoffman, 2000, 322) 
 Two pieces of legislation attempted to fix the problems caused by the urban 
renewal program by giving more control of the allocation of federal funding to cities. 
First in 1974 the Community Development Block Grant Program, which operated with 
the same residential intent as earlier federally sponsored urban redevelopment programs, 
replaced the urban renewal program. (Gotham and Hutchinson, 2001, 11) Second the 
1977 Housing and Urban Development Act provided funding for specific projects in 
distressed areas with the express intent of attracting private capital through the 
availability of Urban Development Action Grants to allow cities to redevelop their 
commercial cores with federally provided incentives. A major stipulation for receiving an 
Urban Development Action Grant required that cities locate private capital to compliment 
the public contribution. (Biles, 2011, 232) Over a ten-year period the program provided 
3,000 projects with $4.5 billion dollars of funding in 1,180 cities but the results never 
materialized. In many cases the funding was used enhance city infrastructure around 
private businesses, which directly benefitted these private enterprises without helping 
needy residents of the city. (Gotham and Hutchinson, 2001, 12) 
The public-private requirements of the grants proved unable to counteract the 
problems that plagued cities at the time, “The strategy was to use federal money to 
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leverage still greater investments from the private sector. By subsidizing a hotel ‘anchor’ 
here, a trendy shopping promenade there, the federal grant would stimulate entrepreneurs 
to invest in projects they would otherwise avoid.” (Logan and Molotch, 1987, 170) Tying 
redevelopment funds to profitability and entrepreneurs meant that these funds were 
always directed towards profitable areas of the cities; federal aid was spent in areas that 
were not distressed; simultaneously the lack of focus on low-rent housing produced 
serious social problems as urban unemployment and poverty rates increased. (Biles, 
2011, 249) 
Later administrations took a much more hands off approach to urban 
redevelopment; instead choosing to place the onus for redevelopment on the cities. The 
Reagan Administration held that, “there is no better federal program than an expanding 
economy,” (Biles, 2011, 252) and federal policy has largely perpetuated this line of 
thinking since. Cities were forced to consider individual programs that would produce 
growth independent of most federal funding. 
Section Three: Urban Renewal In Schenectady 
In 1947 the Town of Tomorrow Committee began agitating for an urban renewal 
program in Schenectady in order to clear and redevelop what were considered blighted 
sections of the city. The necessity of the Town of Tomorrow project is unclear as there is 
no clear evidence that the Schenectady downtown was particularly troubled prior to the 
implementation of the urban renewal program in the city. (Spencer, 2001, 76) Speeches, 
posters, radio campaigns, and newspaper articles were all used to inform the Schenectady 
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residents about the plan which promised to turn Schenectady into “the metropolis of the 
Mohawk Valley.”  
The Town of Tomorrow promised to combat the economic issues confronting the 
city through three projects. First the committee proposed constructing an additional 2,500 
housing units. Second the committee considered clearing a 22-block area around city hall 
to create an area that a redeveloper would presumably step in to build on.  Third 
transportation plans included street widening, including the removal of streetcar lines, 
and the construction of a transportation hub designed to serve the entire capital region. 
(Spencer, 2001 53-54) This demolition plan constitutes policy diffusion as it is motivated 
directly by the existence of federal programs; Schenectady selected its urban 
redevelopment technique from a menu of policy options provided by the federal 
government. 
 The clearance and housing programs were eventually completed, and the notion 
of a transportation hub continues in the public consciousness into the present. Meanwhile 
the razing of 22-blocks around city hall has proven to be particularly problematic for the 
city. The shovel ready site failed to attract developers; the dramatic reduction in housing 
available near the downtown reduced the amount of foot traffic in the downtown area. 
The lack of foot traffic in the downtown area created an unsafe feeling that further 
compounded the problem. 
It is entirely possible that the 22-block area was not a slum at all. The term 
blighted is vague and evidence suggests that the demolition was encouraged for personal 
gain rather than due to any major problems with the neighborhood as in many cities 
“…urban elites promoted redevelopment to reorganize urban areas and to protect and 
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enhance their real estate investments.” (Pritchet, 2003, 4) The specter of urban blight 
allowed city leaders to create and expand these urban renewal authorities, “By elevating 
blight into a disease that would destroy the city, renewal advocates broadened the 
application of the Public Use Clause and at the same time brought about a re-
conceptualization of property rights.” (Pritchet, 2003, 3) In Minneapolis Mayor Hubert 
H. Humprey on the vastness of the problem that faced American cities proclaimed, 
Slums, Rotten broken down areas, are the ulcers, which may develop into 
the cancer that will consume the physical and economic structure of the industrial 
city. Slum areas are extravagances that eat up our revenues and destroy our 
strength. Either we lick the slums or the slums will destroy the city. (Spencer, 
2001, 55) 
 
 Thus across the nation, the eminent domain powers of urban renewal groups was 
expanded; many cities razed sections of supposedly blighted neighborhoods to create 
shovel ready projects that developers would flock to. In practice the creation of shovel 
ready areas destroyed large sections of downtowns, but developers were not as interested 
in developing the renewed sections as redevelopers claimed.  
In Schenectady it is not clear that the 22-block area was different from any of the 
other neighborhoods in the city. “People’s recollections of the neighborhood that 
encompassed the 22 Block area varies, with those who recall it from the late 1940s more 
likely to refer to it as “a real nice neighborhood” while those who recollections are from 
much later tend to describe it as a “run-down” section of the city.” (Spencer, 2001, 74) 
Despite evidence to the contrary the area was deemed blighted and was demolished 
during the 1950’s. The cleared parcel failed to attract a major developer, and was 
eventually built on one lot at a time. A plan originally touted as capable of increasing the 
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city’s tax revenue reduced a former neighborhood and failed to replace it with anything 
of value.  
Section Four: Background on City Decision-Making 
 The case of urban renewal in Schenectady is not unique; local governments are 
not necessarily capable of evaluating and taking the best course of action for their cities. 
In most cases local leaders have motivations that are in direct opposition to the public 
good. Despite all of the general disagreements among local politicians, “With rare 
exceptions, one issue consistently generates consensus among local elite groups and 
separates them from people who use the city principally as a place to live and work: the 
issue of growth. For those who count, the city is a growth machine, one that can increase 
aggregate rents and trap related wealth for those in the right position to benefit.” (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987, 50) The growth of cities produces advantages for those who are in a 
position to profit from said growth; this does not mean that growth is necessarily good for 
the entire population of a city. Note that Logan and Molotch use growth to mean the 
transfer of resources to a city, while Jacobs and Florida both employ different definitions. 
 Because local leaders can all agree on growth as the primary goal of cities they 
must successfully reduce opposition to growth-only tactics, “Although they may differ on 
which particular strategy will best succeed, elites use their growth consensus to eliminate 
ay alternative vision of the purpose of local government or the meaning of community.” 
(Logan and Molotch, 1987, 51) Thus local policy is shaped with very little consideration 
for the costs and benefits of growth in general since the city residents accept the goodness 
of growth as though it were axiomatic.  
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Since growth produces benefits for specific city residents, it is these residents that 
express an interest in politics. Logan and Molotch find evidence for this saying, “The 
people who use their time and money to participate in local affairs are the ones who - in 
vast disproportion to their representation in the population - have the most to gain or lose 
in land-use decision.” (Logan and Molotch, 1987, 62) Since those who profit from 
growth are usually the most involved in local government cities will tend to adopt 
policies that are very favorable towards growth without consideration for the broader 
effects. 
 These pro-growth policies of many western cities during the 18th and 19th 
century provide evidence for this trend. Many areas experienced rapid growth throughout 
the period as, “cities competed to attract federal land offices, colleges and academies, or 
installations such as arsenals and prisons as a means of stimulating development. These 
projects were, for many places, ‘the only factor that permitted them to outdistance less 
favored rivals with equivalent natural or geographic endowments.’” (Logan and Molotch, 
1987, 53) Through a growth-favoring policy certain cities were able to attract facilities, 
many federally financed, which proved invaluable to the city’s future position.  
This competition was highly dependent on government decision-making 
particularly and is notably famous for its impact on transportation. Access to federally 
funded transportation provided cities better access to raw materials and markets. The 
advantage for cities that were capable of attracting canal and railroad terminals was 
marked and desired by cities across the country. (Logan and Molotch, 1987, 53) Indeed 
in Los Angeles city leaders convinced the federal government to spend millions to 
construct the largest artificial port in the world in order to best San Deigo and San 
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Francisco. The competition for access for transportation continued into modern times as 
many cities fought for access to the interstate highway system. (Logan and Molotch, 
1987, 56) The focus on access to the transportation network continues in Schenectady as 
proposals for a consolidated bus and train station persist. 
When it comes to urban redevelopment the mantra, ‘growth is good,’ produces 
poor results, “…for many places and times, growth is at best a mixed blessing and the 
growth machine’s claims are merely legitimating ideology, not accurate descriptions of 
reality. Residents of declining cities, as well as people living in more dynamic areas, are 
often deceived by the extravagant claims that growth solves problems.” (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987, 85) The area of housing tends to produce losses for local government as 
the services that new residents require often cost more than the additional tax revenue 
that their presence provides. Simultaneously cities in possession of ‘unused capacities,’ 
underutilized schools and other city infrastructure, can save some money through the 
additional use of these resources. Unsurprisingly providing housing to the wealthy is 
more lucrative than housing for the poor. (Logan and Molotch, 1987, 86) 
Even in the area of job creation simply creating growth is incapable of adding to 
the total job supply. The United States has a consistent unemployment rate of between 4 
and 11 percent. Attempts to attract new jobs simply transfers employment from other 
cities without necessarily producing anything new, “A game of musical chairs is being 
played at all times, with workers circulating around the country, hoping to land in an 
empty position when the music stops. Redistributing the stock of jobs among places may 
move the chairs around, but it does not alter the number of chairs available.” (Logan and 
Molotch, 1987, 91) Increasing urban growth rates also tends to produce negative effects 
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for social cohesion, particularly in terms of segregation and inequality, as well as 
negatively impacting the environment. (Logan and Molotch, 1987, 93-95) 
Expecting local government to consistently choose the course of action that is best 
for the general population is unrealistic. In urban redevelopment, particularly in the urban 
renewal era, the close proximity of city leaders, with vested interest in land use decisions, 
created perverse incentives that allowed leaders to gain financially from decisions that 
were not best for the city on the whole. Renewal, long lobbied for its ability to produce 
increased low-cost housing, disproportionately removed housing options for cities poor 
residents. As projects that did not engage in slum clearance or housing construction 
began to apply, and receive, renewal funding business leaders were able to contact city 
leaders and have an influence on policy far in excess of other community leaders. (Logan 
and Molotch, 1987, 168) Since these politicians often have incentives that do not 
correspond with the best interest of the city, it is wise to insulate redevelopment decision-
making from the political sphere. Creating a redevelopment organization with little to no 
publicly appointed leaders is often advantageous. 
Section Five: Later Redevelopment of the Federal Era 
 This new era of urban redevelopment forced cities to cease their urban renewal 
programs, and focus on slightly smaller projects instead. (Spencer, 2001, 81) While the 
lack of funds stopped the razing of large areas, buildings could still be demolished one at 
a time and Schenectady adopted this practice with zeal. The theory at the time held that a 
lack of parking in the downtown was holding back the commercial potential of the area; 
the solution to this problem was to demolish disused buildings and install parking lots. 
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Within Schenectady movie theaters, office buildings, high schools, and a railroad station 
were all demolished to make way for more parking.  
As it happens many of the redevelopment plans employed by Schenectady 
mentioned the importance of making the downtown accessible for cars. The 1924 city 
plan called for street widening and while little of the plan was carried out the Town of 
Tomorrow planners was finally able to address the issue. The city needed to combat the 
increasing suburbanization of the surrounding area. Unfortunately the suggested solution 
to suburbanization was to redevelop the downtown into an area with a suburban feel; 
essential to this plan was parking available near stores. During the urban renewal period 
many downtown stores had mall style facades over the original stone and brick facades in 
order to attract shoppers that were used to a suburban style experience. These facades 
were designed to give the area a more attractive and welcoming feeling but in practice 
removed much of the character of the older the downtown. These suburban style facades 
were eventually removed during the 1980s when the original buildings regained 
popularity. (Spencer, 2001, 24-26) 
The new federal focus on large public-private partnerships caused significant 
changes in Schenectady’s redevelopment strategy during the late 1970s. The city turned 
to multiple large projects designed to provide single solutions to the large numbers of 
problems causing urban decline. Many projects of this type were proposed and 
constructed in the city, but the construction of City Center and Canal Square are 
particularly notable examples of both the types of projects that the changes in urban 
redevelopment thinking inspired, and the problems with this large project approach to 
redevelopment.  
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The City Center project was supposed to provide Schenectady with a destination 
that would draw residents back into the downtown. The project was designed in a 
suburban style and included an ice-skating rink, an exhibition hall, and shopping center; 
the ice-skating rink was included mostly because federal funding was available for 
projects that included ice-skating rinks. City Center cost the local and federal government 
a combined $3.3 million and was well over budget by the time the project opened in 
1979. Meanwhile poor architecture meant that the ice-skating rink, which was not quite 
regulation size, had seating available around only half of the rink; many of the available 
seats had their view of the ice blocked by support beams. As the project opened, the 
businesses that were slated to move into the shopping center portion of the project failed 
to materialize and the project slid into bankruptcy. (Spencer, 2001, 88-89) 
After one year of operation it was unclear if the city government would be able to 
continue to pay the utility bills for the building. The city manager remarked, “…the 
project, was never intended to show a profit. The object was to draw people downtown 
where they would spend money in private businesses.” (Spencer, 2001, 89) Even if this 
was the case, Schenectady residents were not drawn back into the downtown by the 
project. Finally by the 1990s, after many years of little to no use, the ice-skating rink had 
been thawed and was being rented to a local soccer league. (Spencer, 2001, 88-89) Today 
the building has been refurbished and is home to a location of the Capital District YMCA 
as well as various offices including the offices of the Metroplex Development Authority. 
 The Canal Square project was designed by Washington based architect Arthur 
Cotton Moore in 1978. The project was supposed to link several of the businesses on the 
400 block of State Street, all painted dark brown with mustard trim for visual uniformity, 
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through both an internal walkway and an external walkway behind the buildings. The 
external passage would face an artificial canal. Customers would then be able to park on 
once side of the canal and reach the shops on the other side using either a bridge or a 
courtesy paddleboat. By the time the project opened it was already $2 million over 
budget; the developer faced foreclosure a few days after the project opened. If the 
financial difficulties were not enough, the architect had not taken the rather cold 
Schenectady winters into account when designing the square; the bridge linking the 
parking lot and stores became dangerously slippery during the winter, and only one year 
after construction the new canal began to leak into a basement of a surrounding building. 
After few years the project was foreclosed the canal was later filled in. (Spencer, 2001, 
90-91) 
 The Canal Square and City Center projects both constitute policy diffusion. 
Schenectady once again selected a redevelopment technique based on federal funding 
options. As with the Town of Tomorrow these federal programs failed to revitalize 
Schenectady’s downtown. 
Schenectady’s redevelopment has been fraught with problems, and had produced 
little. Development by project planners does not necessarily doom projects but in both the 
urban renewal, and later redevelopment projects, the negative results produced by the 
planned approach can be seen. The 22-block urban renewal plan dramatically reduced a 
large portion of the city to rubble. This dramatically reduced the amount of foot traffic in 
the downtown. 
The failure of Schenectady’s early urban redevelopment programs to produce the 
reawakening of the city’s economy is explained by the theory already discussed. Many of 
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the projects, whether through design or oversight, removed people from the street and 
therefore reduced the potential for interaction and safety in the downtown. The Town of 
Tomorrow program eliminated much of the housing available near the downtown. The 
City Center project was designed to be a single project solution in which people would 
spend time and hopefully money. Meanwhile the Canal Square project physically isolated 
shoppers with a completely separate means of approaching the shops and, once shoppers 
successfully navigated the slippery bridge, contained an internal walkway to prevent 
people from leaving the development and spending time on the street. In both cases these 
projects attempted to operate independently of Schenectady and distract people from the 
downtown. Independent of the funding problems experienced by both developments, 
even if they had been successfully constructed, both projects still would have failed in 
their goal to revitalize the downtown based on their inability to inspire interaction within 
the downtown.  The failure of these projects is compounded as precious redevelopment 
capital was wasted, rather than producing gains. 
Here it is inappropriate to discuss the creative class. The introduction of the 
creative class as a basis for urban redevelopment is a more recent, if essential, portion of 
redevelopment. Over time the percentage of the population in the class has increased, so 
actions taken to attract the creative class have greater effect over time. Efforts to attract 
the Creative Class are more likely to succeed in the modern day than in the 1940s. 
 Changes in the availability of federal funds through the 1980s impacted cities 
redevelopment plans. Federal funding for urban redevelopment shrank rapidly during the 
1980s, and as a result cities were forced to focus on smaller and more manageable 
redevelopment projects, or provide funding for large projects themselves. Without 
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adjusting for inflation federal funding dropped from $6.2 billion in 1980 to $2.8 billion in 
1990. The change in federal funding was supported by many of the following presidential 
administrations. During the Carter administration one aide stated, “Cities can adapt and 
change in response to economic and social forces and this process of adaptation can be 
encouraged, but not altered, by the federal government.” (Gotham and Hutchinson, 2001, 
13) Rather than fighting suburbanization and other challenges, cities were forced to adapt 
and produce their own solutions to decline. Some of these solutions have relied on more 
diffused projects, while others have not.  
Schenectady’s urban redevelopment program relied heavily on diffused policy. 
The city entered into redevelopment during the urban renewal period staring with the 
Town of Tomorrow committee. A series of laws passed during the late 1940s allowed 
cities to establish renewal groups that could seize land and create shovel-ready projects 
for redevelopers. Schenectady entered into its own renewal project energetically, and 
eventually demolished a 22-block area around city hall. The impact of this demolition 
was entirely negative; a developer for the area never surfaced, and the lack of housing in 
the downtown dramatically reduced the foot traffic into the downtown. While the 
downtown may not have been particularly troubled before the demolition it was certainly 
going downhill by its completion. 
Later changes to redevelopment laws ceased the urban renewal practice of 
encouraging large-scale demolition, and changed focus to providing support for large 
redevelopment projects. Both the City Center and Canal Square projects of the late 1970s 
are indicative of this process. These projects chose designs from a national menu of 
redevelopment possibilities, and failed to produce much of note. Fortunately another 
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refocus in federal strategy put redevelopment squarely in the hands of the cities 
themselves. 
Many city governments focused on providing a competitive business environment 
rather than on providing city services to residents. This local focus on providing a 
favorable environment for businesses has, “weakened democratic processes and 
safeguards, strengthened the power of private capital in both private and public life, and 
‘depoliticized’ local decision-making and policy implementation.” (Gotham and 
Hutchinson, 2001, 15) While cities may have increased their attractiveness for capital 
investment they have not become better places to live. In these cities support for public 
services has declined dramatically as funding has been reallocated to business incentives 
or the creation of tourist economies. This process has been accompanied by a decline of 
the tax base of these cities and increased demand for city services and welfare programs.
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CHAPTER 3 
 METROPLEX AND NON-DIFFUSED REDEVELOPMENT 
 
Section One: Creation and Contrast 
 While the prevailing urban redevelopment theories of the mid 20th century failed 
to improve Schenectady, a more recent approach has produced a program that has been 
quite successful in redeveloping the area. The Schenectady Metroplex Development 
Authority has successfully implemented a non-diffused approach to redevelopment. 
Under this new authority redevelopment funds are directed towards specific parts of the 
city through both public and private channels. While the authority is a publicly owned 
corporation, it retains a degree of autonomy well beyond that enjoyed by other types of 
redevelopment organizations. The high degree of autonomy at Metroplex gives the 
authority license to consider non-traditional redevelopment projects By working with 
both public and private sectors, Metroplex has been able to create sections of the city in 
which businesses want to operate, and customers want to be. The process is by no means 
complete; large sections of the city remain underutilized or completely unused, but the 
sections of the city that have been focused on by the authority have seen rapid change 
over the last 15 years of redevelopment.  
 Metroplex was created as a follow up to an earlier redevelopment group 
Schenectady 2000. This earlier effort was supposed to redevelop the entrances to the city 
by improving the decaying streets. (Spencer, 2001, 127) Schenectady 2000 was mostly 
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unable to accomplish many of its larger goals with its volunteer support and so Metroplex 
was conceived as an, “IDA on steroids.” (Lewis, 2014) The New York State Legislature 
passed the enabling act in 1998, which guaranteed many legal authorities to Metroplex, 
as well as a continuing source of revenue. The reaction to changes in federal policy is 
clear; since federal funding was no longer available for the types of redevelopment 
projects that Schenectady wanted to engage in, a local option had to be created. 
Metroplex is supposed to improve on both the Industrial Development Agency model and 
the community development corporation model used by Schenectady 2000. 
The Industrial Development Agency attempts to improve a city by providing 
incentives for businesses to locate themselves in the city. These agencies have been a 
very popular redevelopment technique in New York State, but have not been particularly 
successful; these New York State IDA’s have been tasked with improving the state 
economy, not just their specific cities. Since 1969, when the IDA model became an 
option, over 177 agencies have come into being. Industrial Development Agencies 
operate by issuing bonds in order to purchase property for redevelopers. The IDA’s 
property is then rented to a redeveloper with the rent used to repay the principal and 
interest on the issued bonds. After the bonds are repaid the property is sold to the 
redeveloper for a nominal sum. This arrangement provides a subsidy to the developer 
through tax breaks since the city cannot collect taxes on the property, as it is publicly 
owned. (Lynch, Fishgold, and Blackwood, 1996, 58) 
It is unclear if IDA’s are successful in convincing firms to relocate in New York. 
Between 1977 and 1986 only 23 of the firms that received IDA support were relocating 
to the state, and most of these firms reported that they would have relocated without IDA 
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support. Generally the reduction in property taxes is offset by the other costs of operating 
and moving a company. The benefits provided to a company by IDA support are 
minimal, however the impact on local tax revenue is significant. (Lynch, Fishgold, and 
Blackwood, 1996, 62) 
Many of the effects of Industrial Development Agencies produce no benefit for 
the state or city. Many IDA’s will pirate firms by incentivizing a firm to move to a 
municipality from another city in in the state. This maneuver produces no net benefit to 
the state, and only serves to benefit the IDA’s particular municipality; this constitutes 
failure since IDA’s were created expressly to produce a net increase in business in New 
York. In addition many IDA’s support retail projects; additional retail opportunities are 
ineffective in increasing economic opportunity. Consider the case in of supermarkets: the 
construction of one additional market cannot increase the amount of food consumed; thus 
supermarket employees are redistributed from one store to another, but the project does 
not produce any new opportunities. (Lynch, Fishgold, and Blackwood, 1996, 64) While 
IDA’s are not able to effectively incentivize companies to move to New York State, it is 
possible that these groups help to retain existing companies. Metroplex improves on the 
IDA model of urban redevelopment by providing incentives to businesses well in excess 
of what a traditional IDA can offer. The implicit tax cuts offered by an IDA create a 
small incentive to settle in a city, while the larger benefits provided by Metroplex provide 
a much larger incentive to set up shop in Schenectady. 
The community development corporation model dates back to the mid 1960s and 
the urban renewal era. These corporations are grassroots, volunteer initiatives to by city 
neighborhoods to improve themselves. (Stoecker, 1997, 2) Schenectady 2000, with its 
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goal of improving the entire city of Schenectady is a large CDC, but most CDC’s operate 
in much larger cities. The goal of these organizations is to attract new businesses to the 
neighborhoods in which they operate. Unfortunately CDC’s are unsuccessful in this effort 
for two reasons. First broadly improving a city neighborhood requires experience in 
zoning, architecture, and finance, and the community-oriented nature of these 
corporations often requires that these organizations work within their community, and 
these communities generally do not have the expertise to advise the corporation 
adequately. (Stoecker, 1997, 6) Second since community development corporations tend 
to operate in particularly poor areas, their grassroots requires that the corporation be 
limited to the capital readily available in the area. Thus community development 
corporations face the unenviable choice of either tackling small issues in the hopes that 
more capital arrives from an external source, or actively seeking the required capital, 
which often requires the loss of much of the community input. (1 Stoecker, 1997, 2) 
Metroplex improves on the CDC system in two ways. First Metroplex avoids the 
funding problems experienced by many CDC’s by funding itself through a small 
percentage of county sales tax. (“Schenectady Metroplex Development Authority :: 
Frequently Asked Questions,”) Second since Metroplex was established by state, rather 
than by local initiative alone, the authority is not a grassroots organization; unlike CDC’s 
Metroplex is capable of pursuing any redevelopment project, or consult with outside 
experts, without abandoning its original intent.  
The authority also enjoys additional power of eminent domain, which are not 
found in either the IDA or CDC model. Unlike many earlier urban housing initiatives the 
interests of property owners unwilling to sell do not restrict the authority. Of course these 
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prior groups acted with abandon in demolishing swaths of cities. When Metroplex was 
founded the Stockade District, a historic portion of the city, was specifically excluded 
from the authority’s control. Since then the authority has proven itself to be judicious in 
its use of the power, and so the Stockade is now under its control. (Dave Hogenkamp, 
2013) Metroplex enjoys significantly better funding and legal power, which allows the 
authority to overcome the drawbacks of both the community development corporation 
and the industrial development agency. 
The politically insulated nature of the Metroplex board also avoids many of the 
problems discussed by Logan and Molotch. The eleven members of the board are 
political appointees, but the mayors and supervisors of nearby towns as well as members 
of the county legislature appoint them. (Schenectady Metroplex Development Authority 
Act as Amended, § 2563) Separating appointment power between various politicians 
avoids some of the draw of policy diffusion since it is harder to pack the board. 
Section Two: Examples of Metroplex Projects 
 Initial reports of Metroplex projects were not all positive. In 2001 it was unclear if  
the authority would pursue a non-diffused approach; the authority convinced Time 
Warner to relocate nearly 300 jobs 10 miles away from its previous location by spending 
$2.45 million. (Spencer, 2001, 121) A government official familiar, who does not wish to 
be cited, states that difficulty in negotiating with town planners prompted Time Warner to 
search for a new location. Fortunately a new management team took over operation of the 
authority and has pursued a non-diffused approach with great success. Three project 
proposals describe the scope and ability of Metroplex to pursue this diffusion free 
approach. 
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Proctor’s Theater is now a fixture of the Schenectady downtown. However the 
importance of on the street interaction to both economic growth and safety would seem to 
prohibit a project with clear requirement that almost all of the time spent at the project 
requires being physically in the project. The details that distinguish a theater from these 
other projects are simple. A theater draws people into the city at night when the streets 
would otherwise be empty, and the theater requires a large support industry of 
restaurants. A trip to the theater regularly includes dinner before the show. In 
Schenectady’s case this allowed Metroplex to simultaneously create a theater, and create 
interest in new restaurants within walking distance of the theater. The operation of a 
successful theater is a form of import replacement, as residents no longer have to travel to 
other cities for entertainment. Theaters also have a certain draw for the Creative Class, 
which the nascent restaurant scene would encourage. (Schenectady Metroplex 
Development Authority, Proctor’s Theater Expansion ) 
Proctor’s Theater was not a new sight in Schenectady, and its redevelopment 
significantly uplifted many other underutilized buildings. The adjacent Carl Company 
was founded in 1891 as a dry goods store. The company was initially quite successful, 
and soon Charles W. Carl, Sr. quickly opened many branches across the capitol region 
before building a new flagship store in Schenectady at 256 State Street in 1916. Through 
the mid 1900’s the company was successful both at its main Schenectady location, and 
also at its many branch locations in the region. Success continued through the early urban 
renewal efforts; in 1954 the Carl Company became the first locally owned department 
store to open a branch location at the Mayfair Shopping Center. The later 20th century 
was not as kind to the company, which was eventually sold in 1984 to an investment-
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banking group, the General Atlantic Corporation, before being closed entirely in 1991. 
(Schenectady County Historical Society, Guide to the Carl Company Records ) 
The former home of the Carl Company had been vacant for almost 13 years when 
the Proctors Theater project promised to renovate the vacant Carl Company store on State 
Street. The project eventually turned the former department store into administrative 
offices, dressing rooms, a set shop to support the theaters newly renovated main stage, 
and a 450 seat black box theater. The return to prominence of two buildings so important 
to the former glory of the city certainly bolstered interest in the project. 
The renovation also significantly increased the number, and quality, of shows 
Proctor’s Theater could accommodate. Touring Broadway shows had traditionally 
avoided Proctor’s due to an inadequate backstage area; 60 percent of the shows that did 
choose to play at Proctor’s left some portion of their sets in trucks. In order to remedy 
this problem the project proposed a larger, and taller, backstage combined with three 
easy-on/easy-off truck docks to enable traveling shows to fully utilize the location. 
Funding the redevelopment of Proctor’s Theater eventually cost 22.3 million 
dollars. Metroplex was initially asked to provide 9.5 million dollars. In response the 
authority released 1.5 million dollars to the redevelopers, while stipulating that the further 
$8 million be matched by private fundraising or by securing a loan of adequate size in 
order to cover the construction. A successful capital campaign, public donations, and 
grants from Schenectady County were able to match the required $8 million, and provide 
funding for the rest of the project. (Schenectady Metroplex Development Authority, 
Proctor’s Theater Expansion ) 
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The redevelopment at Proctor’s provided short-term benefits to the city as well. 
Construction provided 112 short-term jobs, while the longer-term operation of the theater 
created 22 new jobs. In addition the theater required the creation of 105 new jobs in other 
businesses in order to support the theater. Over the three years following construction the 
project was projected to bring approximately $47 million into the Schenectady downtown 
while the construction would bring approximately$32 million. The Proctor’s project 
offered a lot of economic gain for the region for a sizeable investment from Metroplex of 
$9.5 million in addition to the less direct benefits to the city. (Schenectady Metroplex 
Development Authority, Proctor’s Theater Expansion ) Through non-diffused 
redevelopment a city is capable of producing local anchors. By avoiding the federally 
driven approval process espoused by programs like the Urban Development Action 
Grants, cities can produce solvent, and successful, anchors for their communities. 
The redevelopment project at Proctor’s Theater does not constitute policy 
diffusion. The project renovated and repurposed existing city buildings without the help 
of federal programs, and was not motivated by the success of similar projects in other 
cities. Thus the project was designed to provide a unique solution to the problems 
confronting Schenectady’s downtown. 
 During the many years of economic stagnation in Schenectady many downtown 
property owners had ceased investing in the maintenance of their properties; many of the 
downtown buildings were deteriorating. While these buildings are a huge asset for the 
city, they require significant restoration in order to be fully utilized and desirable 
storefronts, offices, and apartments. In order to remedy this situation Metroplex has 
worked with private developers to provide funding for such restoration. The authority 
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only works is specific areas of the city at any one time, so projects of this nature are 
sometimes denied due to being in a location not under active redevelopment. 
 One of these projects began in December 2011 when Metroplex approved a plan 
by DHA Properties to renovate a former Planned Parenthood location at 414 Union Street 
between Union College and Erie Boulevard. The Metroplex contribution consisted of a 
$30,000 façade grant; the entire renovation was projected to cost $337,500. By keeping 
its own involvement in projects small, Metroplex is able to encourage private investment, 
limit its risk profile, and maintain a larger pool of funding for other proposed projects. 
Improving the façade at 414 Union Street does not constitute policy diffusion. Once again 
the project was not motivated by success in other cities or the availability of federal 
funding.  
 Following completion of the renovation project DHA Properties had already 
identified possible tenants. DHA Holdings, the parent company of the redeveloper, 
planned to base its corporate headquarters out of the property. In addition Innogen 
Business Incubator, a group that “identifies and educates high-tech entrepreneurs on 
organization leadership, business plan development and strategic business growth,” 
(Schenectady Metroplex Development Authority, 414 Union Street Façade 
Project)planned to operate out of the building. Five apartments were also constructed on 
the second floor of the building. The apartment space found its occupants through both 
the Union College graduate school, and Innogen program participants. Both DHA 
Holdings and Innogen cited the decreased operating costs associated with 414 Union 
Street, as well additional space for business expansion. The authority’s limited 
involvement in this type of project allows businesses to relocate to the Schenectady area. 
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 The various tenants of the property provide benefits to the surrounding city. DHA 
Properties and Innogen Business Incubator are similar organizations; DHA Holdings is 
an investment and holding company that invests in small businesses, while Innogen 
Business Incubator works to educate potential entrepreneurs on the specifics of running a 
successful company. Both groups help to foster new business, which in turn produces 
greater opportunities in the Schenectady area. Metroplex involvement in this project 
increases the economic viability of the city on the whole through the benefits each 
company provides to other companies. The ready availability of capital for business 
investments certainly makes the area more attractive to the entrepreneurs found within 
the creative class. (Schenectady Metroplex Development Authority, 414 Union Street 
Façade Project) 
 Metroplex is engaged in many projects that differ in both size and scale. While 
redevelopment projects like Proctor’s Theater are central to the Schenectady downtown, 
such projects, “…effectively and efficiently develop, renovate, and optimize the 
economic and social activities [within the Schenectady area].” (Schenectady Metroplex 
Development Authority, Five Year Capital Project Plan) The city infrastructure must be 
improved to accommodate projects of this type. During the Proctor’s renovation the area 
of State Street surrounding the theater was heavily improved; now the section of State 
Street between Erie Boulevard and North Church Street is undergoing redevelopment.  
The Lower State Street Revitalization Project aims, “to promote safe and 
attractive pedestrian uses; encourage more housing, business and visitors to this area of 
the downtown; and boost redevelopment and rehabilitation with a physically consistent 
and uniform appearance, especially sidewalks and curb cuts that have decayed badly in 
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recent years.” (Schenectady Metroplex Development Authority, Lower State Street 
Revitalization Project) Most vibrant cities try to maintain well kept entrances, so the 
development of Schenectady’s entrances is certainly based on diffused policy. However 
city beautification is a public good, so in this case the negative effects of policy diffusion 
seen throughout urban redevelopment will not be noticeable. In most areas of city 
government policy diffusion is helpful. The project has replaced decaying waterlines, 
replaced and recut cracking sidewalks, planted trees, removed old city lighting and 
replaced them with a more attractive option. In many cases this work is complicated by 
older architectural standards, particularly the older coal cellars underneath the sidewalk. 
These basements used to provide easy access to coal shipments on the street, but now 
create an uneven sidewalk due to a lack of structural integrity in some of the cellars.  
The majority of the funding for the Lower State Street Revitalization project 
comes from Metroplex. The total cost of the project is 2.2 million dollars. Of that the City 
of Schenectady Water Fund provided $500,000, while Metroplex provided $1.7 million 
through its bond issuance authority. The authority’s ability to issue bonds plays a major 
role in assisting the city itself to improve its own infrastructure. 
All three of these projects represent the large variation of projects that Metroplex 
is capable of pursuing. Proctor’s Theater is one of the largest projects undertaken by the 
authority, while the renovation of 414 Union Street is on the small side. Of course the 
Lower State Street Revitalization project is a combination of city and Metroplex 
resources, while the other two projects involve only private companies. Both the 
authority’s non-diffused approach to redevelopment and the aspects of its structure 
encourage successful redevelopment in Schenectady. 
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All three of these projects are representative of other projects completed by the 
authority. By working with both public and private groups across various scales of 
projects Metroplex is capable of pursuing its own redevelopment agenda. Application of 
its political power and funding, with an eye towards avoiding policy diffusion, has 
successfully redeveloped portions of the Schenectady downtown. (Schenectady 
Metroplex Development Authority, Lower State Street Revitalization Project) 
Section Three: Lessons on Redevelopment 
 Many cities in the United States experienced significant declines over the course 
of the 20th century. While the initial root of this decline may rest with any number of 
causes, the Great Depression, suburbanization, or the rise of the automobile, the solutions 
created to combat urban decline significantly injured these already battered downtowns. 
The slum clearance program that was developed during the later years of the depression 
was unleashed upon downtowns as city leaders seized upon large-scale demolitions as the 
path towards economic revival. In reality these attempts to combat blight reduced foot 
traffic to downtowns and amplified the effects of the initial decline. Later attempts to 
combat decline relied on large public-private projects that funneled federal resources 
towards already active parts of cities, or into large projects with too many facets to 
function properly. The diffused policy approach to urban redevelopment failed to 
revitalize urban economies. 
 Policy diffusion is heavily utilized and heavily incentivized in city leaders. In 
most areas of city government, searching for existing solutions to local problems in other 
cities, or from federal policy menus, results in effective programs in many cities. 
Unfortunately in urban redevelopment cities still favor a diffused approach. City leaders 
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tend to be those with a vested interest in land use decisions, and thus may favor policy 
diffusion for personal gain; federal funding played an incredibly important role in 
financing redevelopment projects, and these funds were only available to specific types 
of projects. These projects proved unsuccessful. 
 In Schenectady, New York, a diffused approach to redevelopment substantially 
wounded a potentially active downtown. While the downtown may have been slightly 
distressed in 1948 when the Town of Tomorrow Committee suggested leveling a 22-
block area, the downtown was certainly in trouble following demolition. Later projects, 
like City Center and Canal Square, produced projects that distracted from the urban 
setting. These projects, inspired by funding from Urban Development Action Grants, 
produced shoddy structures incapable of financial success. Both City Center and Canal 
Square quickly slid into bankruptcy following construction. In both periods of urban 
redevelopment the city favored policy diffusion as the downtown became increasingly 
distressed. 
 Fortunately the Schenectady Metroplex Development Authority has proven to be 
capable of initiating non-diffused redevelopment. Integral to this success is the structural 
makeup of Metroplex. County sales tax revenue, political separation, and eminent domain 
allow the authority to pursue an independent and conscious redevelopment program. 
Moreover the authority’s structure is a response to the shortcomings of both the Industrial 
Development Agency and the Community Development Corporation model, and these 
improvements remove some of the potential pitfalls of redevelopment organizations. 
 The authority’s ability to pursue non-diffused redevelopment is evident in the 
projects it chooses to pursue. Due to its organizational structure authority is capable of 
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engaging in both large and small-scale projects, and of cooperating with both public 
agencies and private investors. Moreover all three of the projects reviewed were 
approved based on their ability to encourage economic activity within Schenectady, and 
not for their success in other cities or for the availability of federal funds for such 
projects. The non-diffused approach employed by Metroplex has induced economic 
activity within the Schenectady downtown. 
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